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TRIBAL DISRUPTION AND FEDERALISM
Matthew L.M. Fletcher*
I. INTRODUCTION
Legal and political commentators Richard Epstein and Mario Loyola
argue that modern constitutional federalism has turned state governments
“into mere field offices of the federal government, often against their will,
in turn creating a host of structural problems.”1 The values of federalism—
“diversity . . . innovation [and] local choice”—are, for Epstein and Loyola,
replaced with “heavy-handed, [one]-size-fits-all solutions” dictated by the
federal government.2 Professor Epstein and Mr. Loyola appear to argue that
the Sixteenth Amendment’s authorization of a federal income tax started
decades of “new federalism,” which amounts to nothing more than im-
proper “[f]ederal dominance.”3
American Indian nations and their members and citizens in the modern
era4 have been making similar arguments about state governments for de-
cades.5 Tribal populations are usually too small and too poor to affect state-
wide elections, rendering them invisible to state-elected officials. Occasion-
ally, a tribal member wins an election to a state legislature or a state-wide
office like Attorney General,6 but these instances are rare. Indian nations
have limited national and no state representation; organizations like the Na-
tional Governor’s Association or the National League of Cities rarely, if
ever, include Indian nations. Typically state and local governments con-
fronted by tribal and individual Indian advocates seeking government assis-
tance on anything from snow plowing to law enforcement respond by tell-
* Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. Chi-miigwetch to my friends and
colleagues who have been my partners in devising tribal disruption theory—Kate Fort, Nick Reo, and
Wenona Singel.
1. Richard A. Epstein & Mario Loyola, The United State of America: Washington Is Expanding Its
Power by Turning State Governments into Instruments of Federal Policy, The Atlantic (July 31, 2014),
http://perma.cc/XM6A-D7MN (http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/07/the-federal-take
over-of-state-governments/375270/)  [hereinafter Epstein & Loyola, Washington Expanding]; see also
Richard A. Epstein & Mario Loyola, Saving Federalism, National Affairs, http://perma.cc/4VXG-JKY9
(http://www.nationalaffairs.com/ publications/detail/saving-federalism) (Summer 2014) [hereinafter Ep-
stein & Loyola, Saving Federalism].
2. Epstein & Loyola, Washington Expanding, supra n. 1.
3. Id.
4. As always, I borrow from Charles Wilkinson’s declaration that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), marks the beginning of the modern era of federal Indian law.
Charles F. Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the Law 1 (Yale U. Press 1987).
5. This paper leaves tribal-federal disputes for another day.
6. Larry Echo Hawk, a Pawnee Nation member, served as Idaho’s attorney general in the early
1990s.
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ing tribes and Indians to seek assistance from the federal government: their
trustee. For a century, the Supreme Court has often assumed that states and
their citizens were the “deadliest enemies” of Indian people.7
Indian nations, as the Supreme Court repeatedly points out, were not
invited to the Constitutional Convention and do not have the same status as
states under the Constitution.8 There are benefits for Indian nations to being
outside of the constitutional polity—retention of tribal immunity from suit
for example9—but the negatives are substantial. In contrast, as the Supreme
Court hoped in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,10
states can be very effective at advancing state and local interests through
Congress.11
Politically, tribal interests usually turn to the United States, as the trus-
tee of billions of dollars in tribal and Indian assets around the nation and a
partner in hundreds of Indian treaties and agreements with over 560 Indian
nations.12 But the federal government is a poor trustee. The Bureau of In-
dian Affairs in the Department of Interior is obligated to manage vast tribal
and Indian resources and has never been effective or efficient at its task.
Politically and legally, federal agencies often take positions directly con-
trary to their duties as the tribal trustee, which is acceptable to the Supreme
Court because, while the government is a trustee with fiduciary duties to
Indians and tribes, it must also contend with its duties as the national gov-
ernment.13
7. U.S. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (“[Indian communities] owe no allegiance to the
States and receive from them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling the people of the States
where they are found are often their deadliest enemies.”); see also Br. for Petr., Alaska v. Native Village
of Venetie Tribal Govt., 1997 WL 523883 at *4 (Aug. 21, 1997) (No. 96-1577) (quoting Kagama, 118
U.S. at 384 (“At the same time, because their means of subsistence had fallen prey to westward expan-
sion, reservation Indians were almost entirely dependent upon the federal government for food, clothing,
and protection, and were often ‘dead[ly] enemies’ of the States.”)).
8. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991) (citing Okla. Tax Commn. v.
Citizen Band of Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991) (describing the Constitutional
Convention as “a convention to which [tribes] were not even parties”)); Mich. v. Bay Mills Indian
Community, 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2031 (2014) (citing Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 782).
9. Bay Mills Indian Community, 134 S. Ct. at 2031–2032; Okla. Tax Commn., 498 U.S. at 509.
10. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
11. See John E. DuMont, State Immunity from Federal Regulation—before and after Garcia: How
Accurate Was the Supreme Court’s Prediction in Garcia v. SAMTA that the Political Process Inherent
in Our System of Federalism Was Capable of Protecting the States against Unduly Burdensome Federal
Regulation? 31 Duq. L. Rev. 391, 397 (1993) (noting that Congress enacted an exemption under the Fair
Labor Standards Act to benefit states, undoing the impact of the Garcia decision).
12. See generally David H. Getches, Remarks of David H. Getches: Federal Bar Association Indian
Law Conference (April 7, 2011), 84 U. Colo. L. Rev. 201 (2013).
13. E.g. U.S. v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2326 (2011) (“[T]he Government exer-
cises its carefully delimited trust responsibilities in a sovereign capacity to implement national policy
respecting the Indian tribes.”).
2
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To be sure, the federal and state governments frequently respond effec-
tively to calls for assistance by Indian nations and individual Indians; but all
too often Indian nations and their constituents are left behind. Indian pov-
erty is around 23%.14 Gaming has helped the economic conditions of many
Indian reservations, but not enough: “the absolute difference between con-
ditions on reservations and those nationwide continues to be very large.
Indeed, at recent rates of economic growth it would take decades for per
capita income in Indian Country to converge with that in the rest of the
US.”15
Worse yet, crime rates in Indian country are soaring. The Indian Law
and Order Commission’s 2013 report, “A Roadmap for Making Native
America Safer,” painstakingly detailed the everyday tragedies of Indian
country crime and the largely ineffective federal, state, and tribal re-
sponses.16
Tribal reservation governance is also hamstrung by the presence of
many thousands of nonmembers over which Indian nations have limited
authority. Supreme Court cases in the modern era have recognized restric-
tions on tribal authority to regulate land use,17 adjudicate personal injury
claims against nonmember tortfeasors arising in Indian country,18 adjudi-
cate and regulate property foreclosures of Indian-owned lands by nonmem-
ber banks,19 tax nonmember economic activities,20 and criminally prosecute
non-Indian lawbreakers.21 Indian people typically have to travel long dis-
tances to state courts to bring even the simplest claims against nonmembers.
Worse, nonmembers know that Indian nations usually cannot do much to
prevent illegal nonmember activities and that the federal and state govern-
14. U.S. Dept. of Int., Off. of Asst. Sec.—Indian Affairs, 2013 American Indian Population and
Labor Force Report 11 (Jan. 16, 2014) (available at http://perma.cc/J58P-W3HS (http://www.bia.gov/
cs/groups/public/documents/text/idc1-024782.pdf)) (cited in Bay Mills Indian Community, 134 S. Ct. at
2045 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
15. Randall K.Q. Akee & Jonathan B. Taylor, Social and Economic Change on American Indian
Reservations: A Databook of the US Censuses and the American Community Survey 1990–2010, at 15
(May 15, 2014) (available at http://perma.cc/VS96-37HJ (http://static.squarespace.com/static/52557b58e
4b0d4767401ce95/t/5379756ce4b095f55e75c77b/1400468844624/AkeeTaylorUSDatabook2014-05-15
.pdf)).
16. Indian L. & Or. Commn., A Roadmap for Making Native America Safer (Nov. 2013) (available
at http://perma.cc/5AYZ-47WS (http://www.aisc.ucla.edu/iloc/report/files/A_Roadmap_For_Making_
Native_America_Safer-Full.pdf)).
17. E.g. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408
(1989) (zoning); S.D. v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993) (recreational licensing).
18. E.g. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
19. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Fam. Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008).
20. E.g. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
21. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (non-Indians); see also Duro v.
Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (nonmember Indians); but see U.S. v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (affirming
Congressional “fix” of Duro decision).
3
Fletcher: Tribal Disruption and Federalism
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2015
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\76-1\MON101.txt unknown Seq: 4 25-MAR-15 13:57
100 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 76
ments are not effective in responding, thus making much of Indian country
effectively ungovernable.
As with any entity barred from the political process or ineffective in
changing the political landscape, Indian nations and individual Indians have
taken the rational step of pursuing their interests through litigation. Only in
the most recent half-century have Indian nations had the financial capacity
and, in some cases legal capacity, to assert their interests and the interests of
their tribal memberships in the halls of Congress and the state legislatures,
the federal and state administrative agencies, and in the courts. In the mod-
ern era, many of the most dramatic tribal victories have occurred in court;
but far more often tribal interests do not prevail in court.22 The Supreme
Court, in virtually all historical periods except the Marshall, Warren, and
Burger Court eras, has been especially unreceptive to tribal interests.23
Many of these dramatic disputes involve jurisdictional disputes be-
tween the tribes and states and/or local governments. States and local gov-
ernments, thanks to numerous federal Indian affairs initiatives over the
years, claim jurisdictional prerogatives over nonmembers and nonmember-
owned land in Indian country. As a result, there is conflict between tribal
and state interests. For example, tribes and states often disagree about land
use and environmental regulation of Indian country. As a policy matter,
tribes often demand tighter controls over polluters than states. States and
local governments routinely object to tribal efforts to expand tribal land
holdings. States, local governments, and tribes also conflict over taxes in
Indian country.
In these instances, states seem to be concerned over potential impacts
on the state and local tax base, with a secondary concern about jurisdic-
tional confusion. To be sure, tribes are also concerned about their tax base,
but tribes usually are more interested than states and local governments in
good governance over Indian country lands and people, as well as cultural
and religious concerns. This is not to denigrate state and local governments
as mere one-dimensional tax collectors, but states and local governments
that most strenuously object to tribal activities ultimately cite impacts on
their tax base as their foremost concern.24
22. See Sarah Krakoff, Law, Violence, and the Neurotic Structure of American Indian Law, 49
Wake Forest L. Rev. 743, 747 (2014) (available at http://perma.cc/FJS8-MQYR (https://turtletalk.files
.wordpress.com/2014/10/wfu-krakoff-article-copy.pdf)).
23. See generally David E. Wilkins & K. Tsianina Lomawaima, Uneven Ground: American Indian
Sovereignty and Federal Law (U. of Okla. Press 2001).
24. See Ian Ayres, Report of Ian Ayres on the Cayuga Nation’s Land in Trust Application 1–2 (Feb.
2006) (available at http://perma.cc/4ADQ-RH4Q (http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/legal_protection_pdf/
iareport.pdf)) (“The loss of property tax revenues places fiscal burdens on state and local governments.
The parcel by parcel exercise of sovereignty by the CIN burdens the regulatory control of state and local
government with regard to public safety, land use controls and a host of other state and local regulations.
4
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Federalism is often foremost in the minds of observers when analyzing
tribal claims in light of state and local prerogatives, but federalism theories
and precedents are often unhelpful in reaching useful outcomes.25 After all,
Indian nations are not part of the dual-sovereignty structure of states and the
federal government. The Commerce Clause, and how the Supreme Court
interprets it, sets tribes apart from states and foreign nations.26
Indian tribal governments and their constituents (what I have been re-
ferring to as tribal interests) are unlike other American governments in im-
portant ways. Most tribes are small in population, and many tribal members
live in the same places as their ancestors and will not move. Elected tribal
officials tend to be much more accountable to individual tribal citizens,
many of whom are blood relatives or close friends who have voted in blocs
to elect them. Elected tribal officials are also uniquely aware of the history
of their homelands more so (in my experience) than elected local officials
because the lands upon which an Indian nation is located are riddled with
terrible histories of land dispossession and violence. Many Indian people
stay where they are because their relatives are buried on their lands and they
want the same for themselves. Not only are their relatives buried on these
lands, but places of worship and ceremony are located there as well. As a
result, elected tribal officials are often concerned with protecting tribally
and Indian-owned lands at any cost. This is the impetus for the efforts of
many tribes to intervene in state and local government-aided economic de-
velopment initiatives.
Moreover, tribal officials are interested in the restoration of tribal land
holdings that have fallen out of tribal and Indian ownership. In part because
of the relatively recent histories of illegal land dispossession by non-Indi-
ans,27 many tribal officials are absolutely driven to restore their lands to
tribal and Indian ownership. Indian ancestors and sacred sites are often lo-
cated on nonmember owned lands as well. As a result, some local govern-
ments and private property owners perceive these tribes to be enormous
threats. Many state and local governments expend enormous resources to
defend their interests—such as hiring Yale Law School faculty as consul-
The exemption from taxes and regulation, or heightened difficulties in enforcement of economic regula-
tion, creates an unlevel playing field that would burden non-tribal business—especially with regard to
potential cigarette, gasoline and gaming revenues. These economic and regulatory disruptions would
grow exponentially if BIA established a precedent that allowed the CIN to convert any future open-
market purchase of land into trust land.”).
25. E.g.Wenona T. Singel, The First Federalists, 62 Drake L. Rev. 775 (2014).
26. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also Cherokee Nation v. Ga., 30 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1831) (“domes-
tic dependent nations”).
27. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, “Now What the Hell You Gonna Do in Those Days?” A Research Note
on Practical Barriers to Indian Land Claims (Mich. St. U. Leg. Stud. Research, Working Paper No. 06-
07, May 2, 2008) (available at http://perma.cc/RKK8-J993 (http://ssrn.com/abstract=1128153)).
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tants—even though very few tribal governments have the resources needed
to purchase land and restore the reservation status of that land.
In recent years, state and local governments have been unusually effec-
tive in quelling tribal claims in federal courts by arguing that tribal initia-
tives are disruptive to local governance. In some cases the mere allegation
that a tribal claim is disruptive serves to justify summary dismissal of the
tribal claim without any analysis of the underlying tribal claim.28
States and tribes routinely disagree on Indian child welfare. Child wel-
fare usually is understood to be the exclusive province of the states under
the Constitution,29 but Congress intervened in the context of Indian children
by imposing different standards for state courts to apply and allowing an
expansion of tribal control over Indian child welfare decisions.30 Here, state
agencies and state courts rejecting or circumventing federal standards and
mandates appear to do so because of inertia, that is, the institutional eco-
nomics opposing change.
The very presence of Indian nations within the borders of the United
States and its territories has always been, from the Founding, disruptive.
Indian nations are disruptive, but as I will argue, they are disruptive in the
best possible manner. This paper describes several ongoing tribal-state dis-
putes throughout the nation, acknowledging that the tribal claims are dis-
ruptive, but that tribal disruption is not inherently harmful.
II. TRIBAL DISRUPTION THEORY
Tribal disruption theory draws from ecological theory. As my col-
leagues and I wrote recently, ecological disruption theory provides that the
destruction of a local ecological system might be devastating in the short
run, but creates long-term advantages that outweigh the negatives. Specifi-
cally:
Imagine a wildfire clearing a forest of many of its trees and undergrowth
creating a massive disruption with wide-ranging consequences. While the ini-
tial impact might appear drastic and be perceived negatively the long-term
effects could be very beneficial. Disturbances redistribute resources such as
nutrients and reorganize biological communities in ways that build ecosystem
resilience. To analyze the outcomes of disturbance events it is important to
28. E.g. Onondaga Nation v. N.Y., 500 F. Appx. 87, 89 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The disruptive nature of
the claims is indisputable as a matter of law.”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 419 (2013); Oneida Indian
Nation of N.Y. v. County of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 542 (2011);
Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1128
(2006); contra Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Mich. v. Granholm, 2008 WL 4808823 at **19–21
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 22, 2008).
29. Recent scholarship strongly suggests that this simply is not true. Jill Elaine Hasday, Family Law
Reimagined 17–66 (Harv. U. Press 2014).
30. See generally Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2012).
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carefully consider these events’ spatial and temporal scale and intensity. Eco-
logically beneficial disturbances are often low intensity and occur at small
localized spatial scales. Their full effects are perceivable only at a landscape
scale where many localized disturbances collectively create a diverse ecologi-
cal patchwork.31
Tribal disruption theory posits that tribal governance initiatives that
interfere with state and local governance may generate short-term harms
that are abated by long-term comparative advantage. As my colleagues and
I wrote in a recent paper:
Indian claims often create an analogous disturbance—short term disruption
and even destabilization followed by long term improvements in governance.
Consider the experience of my own tribe, the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa
and Chippewa Indians and its governmental center, Peshawbestown, Michi-
gan. From the 19th century until 1980, the federal government did not ac-
knowledge the sovereignty of the Grand Traverse Band, with whom it had a
treaty relationship dating back to at least 1836. The State of Michigan and
local governments, ironically, did acknowledge the Indian status of the
Peshawbestown Indians and generally refused to provide governmental ser-
vices to the reservation. By the 1970s, the tribal land base had shrunk to just a
few acres, with many Indians landless, unemployed, and literally homeless.
After the Department of Interior acknowledged the tribe in 1980, Grand Trav-
erse Band governmental and economic activity exploded over the next 15
years. Leelanau County, Suttons Bay Township, and the State of Michigan
were reeling, barely able to respond to the sudden presence of a tribal govern-
ment all had formerly disregarded. A flurry of lawsuits and political disputes
followed GTB federal recognition over law enforcement jurisdiction, land use
and zoning, tribal trust land acquisitions, and Indian gaming. Now the dust
has largely settled, and tribal police are cross-deputized to enforce state law in
Leelanau County, the reservation is incorporated into the county land use
plan, and local units of government share—and depend on—tribal gaming
revenues, the Peshawbestown Indians and the non-Indian citizens of Leelanau
County are governed in a better manner.32
A. The Saginaw Chippewa Reservation Boundaries Claim
In our writings, we have identified several instances of highly disrup-
tive tribal governance initiatives. Foremost among them, in my view, is the
successful litigation and negotiation of continuing governance of the Isa-
bella Indian Reservation of the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe in Michi-
31. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Kathryn E. Fort & Nicholas J. Reo, Tribal Disruption and Indian
Claims, 112 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 65, 71–72 (Jan. 2014), http://perma.cc/5D2U-K76U (http://
www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/112/Tribal_Disruption_and_Indian_Claims.pdf).
32. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Kathryn E. Fort & Wenona T. Singel, Tribal Disruption and Labor
Relations 9 (Mich. St. U. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-2, 2014) (available at http://perma.cc/
6BXL-BCD7 (http://ssrn.com/abstract=2401711)) (citing Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Eagle Returns:
The Legal History of the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians 87–107 (Mich. St. U.
Press 2012)).
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gan.33 The reservation, established by treaty, included much of Isabella
County and the City of Mount Pleasant, home to Central Michigan Univer-
sity. The tribe brought federal litigation seeking a declaratory judgment that
the tribe’s reservation boundaries were still intact—a judgment that would
have re-categorized Isabella County and Mount Pleasant as Indian coun-
try.34
The State of Michigan, the county, and the city sought to dismiss the
claims under a theory derived from the Supreme Court’s decision in City of
Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York.35 The Court in Sherrill re-
jected the tribe’s claim to immunity from the local property tax under fed-
eral Indian law due to the enormous passage of time since the land had been
in tribal or Indian ownership36 and the disruption inherent in immunizing
tribal land holdings from local taxation.37 Similarly, the state defendants in
the Saginaw Chippewa matter argued that if the tribe prevailed the outcome
would be to “alter the long existing pattern of jurisdiction over the Tribe
and its members.”38 The Saginaw Chippewa court did not directly address
the merits of the disruption claims made by the state, instead holding that
the Sherrill defense did not apply to claims made under Indian treaties.39
Ultimately, the tribe and the state, county, and municipal defendants settled
the matter in a broad omnibus series of intergovernmental agreements.40
As the court did not directly address the jurisdictional questions on the
merits, we should look to the Saginaw Chippewa Indian tribe’s complaint,
the defendants’ responses, and the settlement to assess the underlying dis-
pute. In its complaint the tribe alleged that the defendants refused to ac-
knowledge the validity of the reservation boundaries and attempted to en-
force state and local laws against tribal members inside of the Isabella In-
33. Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Mich. v. Granholm, 2008 WL 4808823 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 22,
2008); Fletcher, Fort & Reo, supra n. 31, at 70.
34. “Indian country” is a term of art in federal Indian law codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012).
35. 544 U.S. 197 (2005).
36. Id. at 214 (characterizing the tribal tax immunity claim as “rekindling embers of sovereignty
that long ago grew cold”).
37. Id. at 215 n. 9 (“The relief OIN seeks—recognition of present and future sovereign authority to
remove the land from local taxation—is unavailable because of the long lapse of time during which New
York’s governance remained undisturbed and the present-day and future disruption such relief would
engender.”).
38. St. Defs.’ Response to Pl. Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe’s Mot. to Strike Defenses or Limit
Discovery, Saginaw Chippewa, 2008 WL 2383282 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 28, 2008) (No. 05-10296-BC).
39. Saginaw Chippewa, 2008 WL 2383285 at *23 (“The disruption at issue in Sherrill would have
arisen from the Court’s task of fashioning a judicial remedy for the ancient wrongs. In the immediate
case, if a remedy is appropriate, any disruption will follow from the treaties themselves and any act of
diminishment thereafter by Congress.”).
40. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Turtle Talk Blog, Saginaw Chippewa Reservation Boundaries Settle-
ment Materials, http://perma.cc/RQT9-SQSY (http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2010/11/10/saginaw-chip
pewa-reservation-boundaries-settlement-materials/) (Nov. 10, 2010).
8
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dian Reservation.41 The tribe alleged that the state imposed state income
taxes on tribal members residing on the reservation in violation of federal
law.42 The tribe also alleged that the state attempted to enforce state traffic,
child welfare, and other laws on tribal members within the reservation in
violation of federal law.43 The strength of the tribe’s allegations was that
the Supreme Court had long recognized the immunity of reservation Indians
from state control.44 The weakness was that the Supreme Court had more
recently recognized that states do, in fact, have jurisdiction over reservation
Indians that leave the reservation.45
The state defendants, as noted above, relied on the Sherrill defenses.
The State argued the tribe “owns very little property in the alleged ‘histori-
cal Isabella reservation’ today.”46 Isabella County argued that the lands in
question were “overwhelmingly populated by non-Indians.”47 Moreover,
the county argued that if the tribe prevailed, the result would create “a situa-
tion that would significantly disrupt the uniform application of zoning and
other land use regulations, and would seriously disrupt the justifiable expec-
tations of non-Indian landowners.”48 The county argued that the tribe
waited an entire century to challenge state criminal jurisdiction over the
lands within the reservation.49 Similarly, the City of Mount Pleasant
brought forth evidence that only the City, and not the tribe, had prosecuted
41. Amend. Compl. for Decl. & Inj. Relief, Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Mich. v. Granholm,
2006 WL 1036784 at ¶ 8 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2006) (No. 05-10296) (“[D]efendants collectively have
sought to enforce Michigan state laws and regulations against the Tribe and its members on non-trust
lands within the historic Isabella Reservation. Plaintiff alleges that defendants’ actions are in violation of
federal law and must be curtailed.”).
42. Id. at ¶ 9 (alleging that the state taxing authority “has attempted to impose Michigan state
income taxes against members of the Tribe who live and work on non-trust land within the boundaries
of the historic Isabella Reservation, in violation of federal law”).
43. Id. at ¶ 10 (alleging that local authorities attempted to enforce “state traffic laws, child welfare
laws, and other laws within such lands, in violation of federal law”).
44. Worcester v. Ga., 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832) (“The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community
occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can
have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the
Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress.”).
45. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148–149 (1973) (“Absent express federal law
to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been held subject to non-
discriminatory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of the State.”).
46. St. Defs.’ Response to Intervenor-Pl. U.S.’s Mot. in Limine to Strike Defs.’ Witnesses Relating
to Their Eq. Defs. & Mot. for P.S.J. at 5, Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Mich. v. Granholm, 2008
WL 2383284 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 28, 2008) (No. 05-10296-BC).
47. Isabella Co.’s Combined Response to the U.S. & the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe’s Mots.
to Strike & the U.S.’s Mot. for P.S.J. at 9, Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Mich. v. Granholm, 2008
WL 2383283 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 28, 2008) (No. 05-10296-BC).
48. Id. at 10.
49. Id. at 12 (“The County of Isabella has hundreds of records of unchallenged state prosecutions
over tribal defendants for crimes which took place in the townships in question throughout the 1960’s,
1970’s, 1980’s, 1990’s, and 2000’s.”).
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tribal members within the reservation boundaries from 1950 to 1970.50 The
state added that there could be additional impacts on environmental regula-
tion.51 The state’s brief summarized all of these claims.52
Importantly, the county further alleged that what the tribe was really
after was the land, arguing that the tribe’s request for relief amounted to a
possessory land claim.53 The county’s argument was an effort to further
wrap the tribe’s claim into the Sherrill framework by characterizing tribal
governance claims as back-door efforts to reclaim Indian lands.
Ultimately, the tribe and the defendants settled the matter in a series of
about a dozen individual agreements covering multiple jurisdictional sub-
ject areas.54 One agreement involved the application of the Indian Child
Welfare Act55 with the state agreeing to “cooperate and collaborate” with
the tribe “before taking actions that could disrupt a Saginaw Chippewa In-
dian Tribe Child’s relationship to her or his family and tribe.”56 Formal
coordination with an Indian tribe prior to taking any action in accordance
with the Act is not required under the Act and this agreement appears to be
unique in American Indian law.57 The defendants did not allege that a prac-
tice of this kind would create any disruption, although to be sure it does
impose additional burdens on state child welfare agencies.
The parties also entered into a series of law enforcement agreements
that authorized the cross-deputization of state, local, and tribal police; cre-
ated a protocol for communication and cooperation; and ended state and
50. City of Mt. Pleasant’s Response to Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe’s Mot. to Strike Defs. or
Limit Discovery at 19, Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Mich. v. Granholm, 2008 WL 2383285 (E.D.
Mich. Apr. 28, 2008) (No. 05-10296-BC).
51. St. Defendants’ Response to Intervenor-Pl. U.S.’s Mot. in Limine to Strike Defs.’ Witnesses
Relating to Their Eq. Defs. & Mot. for P.S.J. at 9, Saginaw Chippewa, 2008 WL 2383284 (“The effect
of the Tribe’s desired relief on environmental laws would be equally disruptive. It does not matter where
the pollution comes from. If a tribal member discharges untreated wastewater to a stream, river, or lake,
then the stream, river, or lake is polluted for all.”).
52. Id. at 9–10.
53. Isabella Co.’s Combined Response to the U.S. and the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe’s Mots.
to Strike and the U.S.’s Mot. for P.S.J. at 16–17, Saginaw Chippewa, 2008 WL 2383283.
54. Fletcher, supra n. 40 (The court approved the settlement in December 2010. Or. Granting Jt.
Mot. for “Or. for Judm.,” Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Mich. v. Granholm, 2010 WL 5185114
(E.D. Mich. Dec. 17, 2010) (No. 05-10296-BC)).
55. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963.
56. Indian Child Welfare Act Agreement between the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan
and the Michigan Department of Human Services 14 (Nov. 9, 2010) (available at http://perma.cc/53LP-
UVKK (http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2010/11/exhibit-b-icwa-agreement.pdf)) (included as Ex-
hibit B in the Joint Motion to Enter Order for Judgment upon Completion of a Public Comment Period
and Opportunity for the Parties to Respond, Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Mich. v. Granholm,
2010 WL 4784257 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 9, 2010) (No. 05-10296-BC)).
57. See generally Conference of Western Attorneys General, American Indian Law Deskbook
§§ 14.26–14.60, 1052–1071 (4th ed., U. Press of Colo. 2014) (surveying exhaustively the types of inter-
governmental agreements in use in Indian country).
10
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local prosecution of tribal members within the reservation.58 Cooperative
agreements between Indian tribes and state and local governments are not
rare in Indian country59 and most especially not rare in Michigan.60 The
parties reached agreements on land use and regulation as well. The tribe and
the state entered into a memorandum of understanding on environmental
regulation.61 The tribe, the city, and the county entered into zoning agree-
ments.62 The state and the tribe also reached agreement on the application
of the state income tax to tribal members residing on the Isabella Indian
Reservation.63
In their pleadings the defendants vociferously argued that to share ju-
risdiction with the tribe would be deeply disruptive and well-nigh impossi-
58. Law Enforcement Agreement between the Michigan Department of State Police and the Sagi-
naw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan 1–2 (Nov. 9, 2010) (available at http://perma.cc/6YCL-PGZT
(http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2010/11/exhibit-c-law-enforcement-agreement.pdf)) (included as
Exhibit C in Joint Motion to Enter Order for Judgment upon Completion of a Public Comment Period
and Opportunity for the Parties to Respond, Saginaw Chippewa, 2010 WL 4784257); Law Enforcement
Agreement between the City of Mt. Pleasant and the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan 1–2
(Nov. 9, 2010) (available at http://perma.cc/LBH5-8T7R (http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2010/11/
exhibit-h-city-law-enforcement-agreement.pdf)) (included as Exhibit H in Joint Motion to Enter Order
for Judgment upon Completion of a Public Comment Period and Opportunity for the Parties to Respond,
Saginaw Chippewa, 2010 WL 4784257); Law Enforcement Agreement between the County of Isabella
and the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan 1–2 (Nov. 9, 2010) (available at http://perma.cc/
5P9M-PX9L (http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2010/11/exhibit-l-county-law-enforcement-agreement
.pdf)) (included as Exhibit L in Joint Motion to Enter Order for Judgment upon Completion of a Public
Comment Period and Opportunity for the Parties to Respond, Saginaw Chippewa, 2010 WL 4784257).
59. See generally Michael L. Barker & Kenneth Mullen, Cross-Deputization in Indian Country, 16
Police Stud.: Intl. Rev. Police Dev. 157 (1993); Conf. of W. Attys. Gen., American Indian Law
Deskbook 633–635, 656 (4th ed., U. Press of Colo. 2008).
60. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Kathryn E. Fort & Wenona T. Singel, Indian Country Law Enforce-
ment and Cooperative Public Safety Agreements, 89 Mich. B.J. 42, 43–44 (Feb. 2010).
61. Memo. of Understanding between the State of Mich. Dept. of Nat. Resources & Env. & the
Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Mich. (Nov. 9, 2010) (available at http://perma.cc/CXZ6-T2QT
(http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2010/11/exhibit-f-conservation-mou.pdf)) (included as Exhibit F in
Joint Motion to Enter Order for Judgment upon Completion of a Public Comment Period and Opportu-
nity for the Parties to Respond, Saginaw Chippewa, 2010 WL 4784257.
62. Zoning and Land Use Agreement between the City of Mt. Pleasant and the Saginaw Chippewa
Indian Tribe of Michigan (Nov. 9, 2010) (available at http://perma.cc/9FLE-ACTP (http://turtletalk.files
.wordpress.com/2010/11/exhibit-g-city-zoning-agreement.pdf)) (included as Exhibit G in Joint Motion
to Enter Order for Judgment upon Completion of a Public Comment Period and Opportunity for the
Parties to Respond, Saginaw Chippewa, 2010 WL 4784257); Zoning and Land Use Agreement between
the County of Isabella and the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan (Nov. 9, 2010) (available at
http://perma.cc/F9TK-HRTS (http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2010/11/exhibit-k-county-zoning-ag
reement.pdf)) (included as Exhibit K in Joint Motion to Enter Order for Judgment upon Completion of a
Public Comment Period and Opportunity for the Parties to Respond, Saginaw Chippewa, 2010 WL
4784257).
63. Memo. of Agreement Regarding Income-Tax Resolution between the State of Mich. & Saginaw
Chippewa Indian Tribe of Mich. (Nov. 9, 2010) (available at http://perma.cc/MF5L-G8AB (http://turtle
talk.files.wordpress.com/2010/11/exhibit-e-income-tax-resolution.pdf)) (included as Exhibit E in Joint
Motion to Enter Order for Judgment upon Completion of a Public Comment Period and Opportunity for
the Parties to Respond, Saginaw Chippewa, 2010 WL 4784257).
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ble—and yet here are a series of workable agreements borrowing exten-
sively from the experiences of other tribes.
Imagine similar disputes between the State of Michigan and the federal
government—the stuff of American federalism. The United States, backed
by the Supremacy Clause, usually dictates law enforcement activities in
cases of federal criminal law—as seen in virtually every police procedural
on TV. The same is largely true in environmental regulation and taxation
areas of cooperative federalism.64
The Saginaw Chippewa reservation boundaries settlement involved ne-
gotiations between governments rewriting jurisdictional lines from a blank
slate. It is apparent from the defendants’ pleadings that no negotiation could
have been as fruitful absent litigation and it is further apparent that the
court’s rejection of the defendants’ disruption claims persuaded the defend-
ants to reach an endgame in negotiations. In the end, the Saginaw Chippewa
Indian Tribe got everything it stated that it wanted in its complaint—cer-
tainty about law enforcement, child welfare, and taxation. The defendants
also got what they wanted—avoidance of jurisdictional complexity and
confusion.
The Saginaw Chippewa reservation boundaries settlement is a model
for other tribes and jurisdictions to follow—and a model of how tribal dis-
ruption theory works. Recently, the Oneida Indian Nation of New York
entered into a massive agreement with the State of New York and Madison
and Oneida Counties to conclude decades of vituperative litigation over
land claims, property taxes, gaming, and other disputes.65 Similarly, the St.
Regis Mohawk Tribe entered into an agreement with the State of New York
and St. Lawrence County, concluding land claims and resolving jurisdic-
tional taxation and regulatory problems.66
B. The Onondaga Nation and Onondaga Lake
The Saginaw Chippewa experience did not replicate itself in the dis-
pute between the Onondaga Nation and the State of New York, Onondaga
County, and the City of Syracuse. The Onondaga Nation’s homelands
center on Onondaga Lake—known at the time of the filing of the suit, as
64. See generally Jonathan H. Adler, When Is Two a Crowd? The Impact of Federal Action on State
Environmental Regulation, 31 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 67 (2007).
65. Fletcher, Fort & Reo, supra n. 32, at 70–71; Memorandum-Decision & Order, N.Y. v. Jewell,
2014 WL 841764 at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2014) (No. 6:08-CV-0644 (LEK/DEP)).
66. Memo. of Understanding between the County of St. Lawrence, the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe,
& N.Y. (May 28, 2014) (available at http://perma.cc/MW3Y-35FZ (http://www.srmt-nsn.gov/_uploads/
site_files/NYS-SRMT-SLC_MOU_Signed_5-28-14.pdf)).
12
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the “most polluted lake” in the United States.67 The tribe unsuccessfully
attempted, over many years, to deal with the state and local governments
over how to properly regulate and clean the lake.68 Eventually, the state
negotiators informed the tribe that the only way to move forward was for
the tribe to bring land claims on Onondaga Lake, which would force the
state into negotiations and provide political cover for the state to make con-
cessions to the tribe.69
The Onondaga Nation brought land claims in federal court arguing that
the State of New York’s purchase of several parcels from the tribe in the
nineteenth century violated the Nonintercourse Act70 and was therefore
void.71 The tribe also sued local governments and businesses that occupied
the lands.72 Carefully, the tribe chose not to sue for recovery of the land or
money damages from any of the defendants:
The Nation does not seek in this lawsuit and has never sought any remedy
that dispossesses evicts or ejects any person, government, corporation, or en-
tity owning land within the area taken by the State. This is not a possessory
action. The Onondagas did not assert any legal theory that could be the basis
for an award of money damages in any form. They did not ask for additional
compensation or restitution. They did not ask for rent. They did not ask to be
compensated for the widespread and serious environmental damage associ-
ated with the “development” of these lands by persons tracing their titles to
the State.73
The tribe chose not to sue to avoid the so-called Sherrill defenses that led
the Second Circuit to dismiss other land claims by New York tribes.74
The Second Circuit’s dismissal of the Onondaga claims was perfunc-
tory and based entirely on three factors: (1) “the length of time at issue
between a historical injustice and the present day;” (2) “the disruptive na-
ture of claims long delayed;” and (3) “the degree to which these claims
upset the justifiable expectations of individuals and entities far removed
67. Onondaga Nation, Onondaga Lake—The Most Polluted Lake in America, http://perma.cc/
A5NZ-BNSZ (http://www.onondaganation.org/land-rights/onondaga-lake/) (accessed Sept. 1, 2014);
David Chantry, NPR, America’s “Most Polluted” Lake Finally Comes Clean, http://perma.cc/7G6D-
KKF3 (http://www.npr.org/2012/07/31/157413747/americas-most-polluted-lake-finally-comes-clean)
(July 31, 2012).
68. See generally Conference Transcript, Heeding Frickey’s Call: Doing Justice in Indian Country,
37 Am. Indian L. Rev. 347, 351–358 (2013).
69. I learned this in conversation with Onondaga Nation Attorney Joe Heath.
70. 25 U.S.C. § 177.
71. First Amend. Compl. for Declaratory Judm., Onondaga Nation v. N.Y., 2005 WL 4136413 at ¶¶
7–10 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2005) (No. 05-CV-314 (LEK/DRH)).
72. Id. at ¶¶ 11–16.
73. Pet. for a Writ of Cert., Onondaga Nation v. N.Y., 2013 WL 1771079 at *9 (U.S. Apr. 22, 2013)
(No. 12-1279).
74. See Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005); Oneida Indian Nation
of N.Y. v. Co. of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2010).
13
Fletcher: Tribal Disruption and Federalism
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2015
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\76-1\MON101.txt unknown Seq: 14 25-MAR-15 13:57
110 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 76
from the events giving rise to the plaintiffs’ injury.”75 Under the Second
Circuit’s reasoning, it was irrelevant that the tribe was unable to bring suit
for many decades after the transactions—the 183 years between the transac-
tions and the suit was too long as a matter of law: “[E]ven if the Onondaga
showed after discovery that they had strongly and persistently protested, the
‘standards of federal Indian law and federal equity practice’ stemming from
Sherrill and its progeny would nonetheless bar their claim.”76 It was also
irrelevant that the tribe merely sought a declaratory judgment: “[t]he disrup-
tive nature of the claims is indisputable as a matter of law. It is irrelevant
that the Onondaga merely seek a declaratory judgment. Oneida held that a
declaratory judgment alone—even without a contemporaneous request for
an ejectment—would be disruptive.”77 In short, no evidence is necessary in
the Second Circuit to dismiss Indian land claims under the Nonintercourse
Act—a court may dismiss them as a matter of law. The Nation—having
exhausted its national remedies—is now seeking relief before the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights.78
The tribe’s efforts to negotiate failed. State interests would not negoti-
ate with a non-owner of the property at issue, and the federal courts’ refusal
to allow the tribe’s suit to move forward—which may have compelled the
state to enter into negotiations—failed due to an expansive reading of a
Supreme Court Indian taxation case.
As the Onondaga story demonstrates, not every tribal-state-local dis-
pute will end well. But the Saginaw Chippewa agreements demonstrate that
a great deal is possible and that tribal disruption can be beneficial in the
long run toward resolving longstanding concerns between sovereigns.
III. ONGOING CONFLICTS
There are numerous tribal-state conflicts brewing in Indian country at
this time. In virtually all of these conflicts, the state interests argue that
tribal claims are too disruptive to implement fairly and efficiently. In most
instances, the law is behind state interests. But as Professor Singel demon-
75. Onondaga Nation v. N.Y., 500 Fed. Appx. 87, 89 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Oneida, 617 F.3d at
127), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 419 (2013).
76. Onondaga, 500 Fed. Appx. at 90 (quoting Sherill, 544 U.S. at 214). The tribe had offered the
expert testimony of several leading legal historians. See e.g. Decl. of Lindsay G. Robertson in Opposi-
tion to Mots. to Dismiss, Onondaga, 2006 WL 6897840 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2006) (No. 05-CV-314
(LEK/DRH)); Decl. of Anthony F.C. Wallace in Opposition to Defs.’ Mots. to Dismiss, Onondaga,
2006 WL 6897838 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2006) (No. 05-CV-314 (LEK/DRH)).
77. Onondaga, 500 Fed Appx. at 89 (citing Oneida, 617 F.3d at 138).
78. Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights submitted by the Onondaga Na-
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strates, much of what courts analyze in federal Indian law to resolve tribal-
state disputes is well-nigh irrelevant to the underlying governance issues.79
A. Land — Wind River Reservation
On December 19, 2013, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
approved an application by the two tribes that share the Wind River Indian
Reservation in Wyoming to be treated as states under the Clean Air Act80
for the purpose of monitoring air quality on the reservation.81 The EPA has
previously granted treatment-as-state (TAS) status under the Act to a few
dozen Indian tribes nationally.82 Monitoring authority is not the same as
enforcement authority—a tribe might seek that authority but must go
through a much more strenuous process.83 As the EPA’s decision document
stated, “[t]he Tribes’ application does not request, nor by this decision is the
EPA approving, Tribal authority to implement any [Clean Air Act] regula-
tory programs or to otherwise implement Tribal regulatory authority under
the Act.”84 Instead, the tribes are eligible to apply for a reduced funding
match requirement for federal funding to submit written recommendations
on permits that might affect reservation air quality and other governmental
participation requirements.85
The two tribes that share the Wind River Indian Reservation, the
Northern Arapaho Tribe and the Eastern Shoshone Tribe, have been inun-
dated with pollution from fracking in recent years. National Public Radio
reported that the EPA allegedly allowed toxic oil water from fracking to
flow across tribal lands.86 The EPA has a decades-long history of under-
79. Singel, supra n. 25, at 845 (“The Supreme Court rarely recognizes tribal contributions to effec-
tive governance within the nation’s federal system. Frequently, the characteristics of governance that are
celebrated as promoting federalism’s values in the federal-state context are neglected or even portrayed
as disadvantages in the tribal context.”).
80. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2012).
81. 78 Fed. Reg. 76829-02, 76829–76830 (Dec. 19, 2013).
82. EPA, Tribal Air, Basic Information, http://perma.cc/PM7S-FHME (http://epa.gov/air/tribal/
backgrnd.html) (accessed Sept. 1, 2014) (“32 tribes have received eligibility determinations (TAS)
under the Tribal Authority Rule”).
83. 40 C.F.R. § 49.7 (2014).
84. EPA Region 8, Decision Document 1 (Dec. 6, 2013) (available at http://perma.cc/8TND-D7GS
(http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/2012nwpcertification_montana.pdf)).
85. Id. at 1–2.
86. Elizabeth Shogren, NPR, Loophole Lets Toxic Oil Water Flow Over Indian Land, http://perma
.cc/UR29-YJ8S (http://www.npr.org/2012/11/15/164688735/loophole-lets-toxic-oil-water-flow-over-in
dian-land) (Nov. 15, 2012) [hereinafter Shogren, Loophole]; see also Elizabeth Shogren, NPR, EPA
Wants to Allow Continued Wastewater Dumping, http://perma.cc/JFM5-78A6 (http://www.npr.org/
2013/08/07/209832887/epa-wants-to-allow-continued-wastewater-dumping-in-wyoming) (Aug. 7,
2013) [hereinafter Shogren, Wastewater Dumping].
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regulating the reservation.87 Even the state asked why the EPA had not
acted.88 In their application for TAS status, the tribes stated that there are
several facilities on the reservation “with the potential to emit more than
100 tons per year of air pollutants.”89 The Wind River tribes cannot stop
fracking and its impacts on the reservation, especially on non-Indian lands,
when the EPA authorizes it.
The TAS decision resulted in a firestorm of opposition from public and
private interests. Local news published stories about the decision under
headlines such as: “EPA Moves 3 Wyoming Towns into an Indian Reserva-
tion;”90 “EPA: Riverton part of the Wind River Indian Reservation;”91 and
“EPA overrides Congress, hands over town to Indian tribes.”92 Opponents
of the EPA’s decision even published an article suggesting the Obama Ad-
ministration was moving on from Wyoming and planning to depopulate the
entire State of Montana by redrawing the reservation boundaries of the Flat-
head Indian Reservation in Montana,93 prompting an article on Snopes.com
debunking the rumor.94
More seriously, the Wyoming Governor, Matthew H. Mead, published
a letter to the editor arguing that the EPA’s decision undermined state tax-
87. Shogren, Loophole, supra n. 86 (“Outside the reservation, Western states decide how oil field
waste is handled—and their rules are stricter than the EPA’s. For instance, off the reservation, the state
of Wyoming requires companies to inject wastewater deep underground and out of harm’s way if
they’ve added toxic chemicals to the wells. Other states have set tougher water quality standards that
have nearly eliminated these releases. On the Wind River Reservation, these oil field wastewater streams
have flowed for several decades without attracting much interest, even from the tribes, according to Wes
Martel and other officials of the two tribes that share the reservation, the Eastern Shoshoni and Northern
Arapaho.”).
88. Id. (“Even the state of Wyoming, which is known to be pro-industry, questioned the fact that
the EPA’s requirements didn’t seem to protect aquatic life. The EPA’s response was that the tribes had
not adopted their own water quality standards.”).
89. EPA, Application for Treatment in a Manner Similar to a State under the Clean Air Act for
Purposes of Section 1–5 Grant Program Affected State Status and Other Provisions for Which No
Separate Tribal Program is Required 16 (Dec. 17, 2008) (available at ftp://ftp.epa.gov/r8/WindRiver
ConsideredDocuments/Application/ EPAWR000002.pdf).
90. Jennifer G. Hickey, EPA Moves 3 Wyoming Towns into an Indian Reservation, Newsmax (Jan.
16, 2014) (available at http://perma.cc/L722-PZLN (http://www.newsmax.com/US/epa-wyoming-indi
an-reservation/2014/01/16/id/547503/)).
91. Kyle Roerink, EPA: Riverton Part of the Wind River Indian Reservation, Casper Star Tribune
(Dec. 10, 2013) (available at http://perma.cc/3Q72-W3HA (http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/epa-
riverton-part-of-the-wind-river-indian-reservation/article_d476fc0c-9dc5-5660-bb52-eb9fff1639f8
.html)).
92. Michael Bastach, EPA Overrides Congress, Hands over Town to Indian Tribes, The Daily
Caller (Jan. 8, 2014) (available at http://perma.cc/8CQU-QQEV (http://dailycaller.com/2014/01/08/epa-
overrides-congress-hands-over-town-to-indian-tribes/)).
93. Sorcha Faal, Obama Plan to Depopulate Montana Raises Crisis Fears in Moscow,
WhatDoesItMean.com, http://perma.cc/G9FZ-DSDN (www.whatdoesitmean.com/index1732.htm) (Jan.
17, 2014).
94. Snopes.com, Outboxing Helena, http://perma.cc/V3BE-D8KL (http://www.snopes.com/politics/
conspiracy/montana.asp) (updated Jan. 27, 2014).
16
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ing and regulatory authority, law enforcement jurisdiction, and private
property rights.95 Serious news reports suggest that non-Indians and local
government officials within the exterior are concerned that tribal law en-
forcement officers will begin ticketing nonmembers, or even will begin
bringing criminal charges in tribal court against non-Indians.96 The state
attorney general alleged that tribal members incarcerated under state law
might challenge their convictions on jurisdictional grounds, and that local
food service facilities would go unregulated.97 The Wyoming Congres-
sional delegation proposed legislation to clarify the reservation status of the
Wind River Indian Reservation, a proposal the tribes equate with termina-
tion.98
These questions can all be addressed through negotiation, as the tribes
themselves have suggested.99 The Saginaw Chippewa reservation bounda-
ries settlement, as well as the Oneida and St. Regis Mohawk settlements,
can serve as a template.
95. Matthew H. Mead, Ltr. to the Ed., EPA Action on Rez ‘is Unlawful,’ The Ranger (Jan. 8, 2014)
(available at http://perma.cc/JB2A-WQCS (http://www.dailyranger.com/story.php?story_id=10738&
headline=EPA-action-on-rez-%27is-unlawful%27)).
96. Irina Zhorov, Wyoming’s Reservation’s Redrawn Borders Put Old Conflicts Back on Map, Al
Jazeera America (Feb. 6, 2014) (available at http://perma.cc/9MKU-FJ4U (http://america.aljazeera.com/
articles/2014/2/6/wyoming-reservationsredrawnlinesputoldconflictsbackonmap.html)) (“Criminal-juris-
diction issues in particular are alarming to the local government. The reservation has high crime rates—
including violent crime—and limited law-enforcement muscle. What law enforcement exists isn’t al-
ways trusted. In the past, the state didn’t want to permit Wind River officers to issue traffic citations to
nontribal drivers on the reservation, not to mention handling more serious offenses. People like Thomp-
son also fear that non-Native Riverton residents could end up in tribal rather than municipal court,
though that doesn’t happen now on undisputedly tribal land.”).
97. Id. (“The concerns listed by Attorney General Peter Michael include potential outcomes rang-
ing from the Wyoming Highway Patrol’s losing authority in the Riverton area to incarcerated tribal
members’ challenging their sentences on jurisdictional grounds to Riverton food-service facilities’ oper-
ating without regulations.”).
98. County 10, Wyoming Delegation Draft Bill Seeks to Clarify Boundaries of Wind River Reserva-
tion; Tribal leaders Say It’s an Attack on Tribal Lands, http://perma.cc/C73L-9KAD (http://county10
.com/2014/04/02/enzi-draft-bill-seeks-withdraw-1m-acres-wind-river-reservation-northern-arapaho-
leaders-call-tribes-oppose-bill/) (accessed Aug. 30, 2014).
99. Press Release, Eastern Shoshone Tribe Response to EPA Issuing Partial Stay of Its Decision to
Wyoming (Feb. 13, 2014) (available at http://perma.cc/FL55-DTCG (http://turtletalk.files.wordpress
.com/2014/02/2014-02-13-press-release-re-epa-issues-stay.pdf)) (“The partial stay is a benefit to the
Tribe because it gives the Shoshone and Arapaho Tribes a chance to have meaningful discussions with
the State of Wyoming, the Fremont County Commissioners, and the Riverton City Government, about
all the issues Wyoming raised in its request to EPA for the stay. We, as responsible governments and
stewards of the land, can approach our issues in a reasonable and calm way and try to resolve any
disputes without fear and misinformation.”).
17
Fletcher: Tribal Disruption and Federalism
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2015
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\76-1\MON101.txt unknown Seq: 18 25-MAR-15 13:57
114 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 76
B. Economic Development — Sault Ste. Marie Tribe
of Chippewa Indians
Northern Michigan Indian tribes have attempted to establish Indian
gaming facilities in the more populous southern portion of the state for de-
cades. The Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa, which once owned a casino
in Detroit that it lost in bankruptcy, began the process of opening two facili-
ties, one in Lansing, Michigan, and one near the Detroit Metropolitan Air-
port.100 In general, though they might not characterize it this way, the Mich-
igan tribes and the State of Michigan are business partners in the gaming
business. They are parties to a dozen Class III gaming compacts under the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA)101—all of which implement sub-
stantial revenue sharing of gaming profits between the tribes, the state, and
local governments.102 Moreover, Michigan and the tribes all entered into an
agreement in 2005 to cooperate on economic development issues.103
The Sault Tribe’s proposals circumvent the normal protocol for off-
reservation gaming—the so-called “two-part determination” provided for in
IGRA.104 The two-part determination is incredibly difficult to complete,
and only a small handful of tribes have been successful in navigating the
process to open a tribal gaming facility in a metropolitan market.105 The
tribe here argues that the proposal is not an off-reservation gaming proposal
at all, but instead is an on-reservation proposal—or will be, once the Inte-
rior Secretary agrees to acquire the relevant land in trust for the tribe in
100. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Turtle Talk Blog, Sault Tribe Lansing Casino Trust Application Docu-
ments, http://perma.cc/5HB4-M852 (http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2014/06/11/sault-tribe-lansing-casi
no-trust-application-documents/) (June 11, 2014) [hereinafter Fletcher, Sault Tribe Lansing Casino Doc-
uments]; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Turtle Talk Blog, Sault Tribe Huron Township, Wayne County Trust
Application Documents, http://perma.cc/5HB4-M852 (http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2014/06/11/sault-
tribe-huron-township-wayne-county-trust-application-documents/)(June 11, 2014) [hereinafter Fletcher,
Sault Tribe Huron Township Documents].
101. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721.
102. To view the compacts, see Michigan Gambling Control Board, Tribal-State Compacts in Michi-
gan, http://perma.cc/W66Y-XW5A (http://www.michigan.gov/mgcb/0,1607,7-120-1380_1414_2182—-
,00.html)(accessed Aug. 31, 2014).
103. Intergovernmental Accord between the Tribal Leaders of the Federally Recognized Indian
Tribes in Michigan and the Governor of the State of Michigan Concerning Economic Development
Interests (May 13, 2005) (available at http://perma.cc/7CAD-W5UJ (http://www.michigan.gov/docu
ments/som/2005_Econ_Accord_-SOS-OGC_195714_7.pdf?20140801145021)).
104. 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A).
105. Memo. from Ken Salazar, Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs, to Walter Echohawk, Decisions
on Indian Gaming Applications 2 (June 18, 2010) (available at http://perma.cc/9XWP-V3CU (http://
www.doi.gov/tribes/upload/Salazar-Echohawk-Memo-gamin-June-18.pdf).
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accordance with the Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act.106 It’s a
stretch,107 but a plausible argument.
Michigan108 and at least two downstate tribes109 staunchly oppose the
Sault Tribe’s initiative. According to news reports, the state and their tribal
allies oppose the downstate casinos because they would violate the terms of
the gaming compacts between all of the tribes.110 The two tribes have ar-
gued that the Sault Tribe is leaving its own traditional territories and would
undermine their market share; the state similarly has mentioned its interest
in the three Detroit casinos, all of which pay large amounts of taxes to the
state.111 In short, though the state may not say so publicly, the goal of each
party is to maximize revenues for governmental purposes112 (which is im-
portant because the three Detroit casinos are not public entities and are not,
technically, involved in this dispute).
The obvious answer for an outside observer, unbiased by political and
other leanings, is to identify the dispute in terms of simple dollars. The
three Detroit casinos paid out over $109 million in state taxes in calendar
106. Pub. L. No. 105–143, § 108(f), 111 Stat 2652, 2661–2662 (1997) (according to the tribe, the
statute mandates the Interior Secretary to acquire tribal lands in trust so long as the tribe purchased the
lands with settlement funds: “Any lands acquired using amounts from interest or other income of the
Self-Sufficiency Fund shall be held in trust by the Secretary for the benefit of the tribe.”).
107. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Turtle Talk Blog, City Pulse: Fletcher’s Four Barrier[s] to the Lan-
sing Casino Proposal (and Additional Commentary), http://perma.cc/Z96V-MSCE (http://tur-
tletalk.wordpress.com/2012/01/27/city-pulse-fletchers-four-barrier-to-the-lansing-casino-proposal-and-
additional-commentary/) (Jan. 27, 2012).
108. Michigan v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 737 F.3d 1075 (6th Cir. 2014) (Michi-
gan lost the case on tribal sovereign immunity grounds, and withdrew its petition for writ of certiorari
after losing Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 134 S. Ct. 2024 (2014), which involved substan-
tially the same issues); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Turtle Talk Blog, Michigan Withdraws Cert Petition in
Michigan v. Sault Tribe, http://perma.cc/K98W-UM84 (http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2014/06/03/
michigan-drops-cert-petition-in-michigan-v-sault-tribe/) (June 3, 2014).
109. Br. of Amicus Curiae Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Mich. in Support of Appellee to
Uphold the Prelim. Inj., Sault Ste. Marie Tribe, 2013 WL 3296413 at *2 (6th Cir. June 24, 2013) (No.
13–1438); Amicus Curiae Br. of the Nottawseppi Huron Band of the Potawatomi on Behalf of the St. of
Mich., Sault Ste. Marie Tribe, 2013 WL 3296411 at **2–3 (6th Cir. June 21, 2013) (No. 13–1438) (The
Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe and the Nottawseppi Huron Band of the Potawatomi both filed briefs in
support of the State of Michigan.).
110. Lindsay VanHulle, U.P. tribe plans casinos near Detroit Metro Airport, Lansing, Det. Free
Press (June 11, 2014) (available at http://perma.cc/ZYA2-9SHR (http://www.freep.com/article/
20140611/NEWS06/306110134/indian-casino-airport-Lansing)) (“Opponents, including other Michigan
tribes, say the Sault tribe’s plans violate a gaming compact it signed with the state that require revenue-
sharing agreements from other in-state tribes before opening a casino.”).
111. Mich. Gaming Control Bd., Detroit Casino Revenues, http://perma.cc/NYS6-6F9T (http://www
.michigan.gov/mgcb/0,1607,7-120-1380_57134_57590—-,00.html) (accessed Aug. 31, 2014). In calen-
dar year 2013, the Detroit casinos paid over $109 million in state wagering taxes to the state. Mich.
Gaming Control Bd., Detroit Casino Revenues, Calendar Year 2013, http://perma.cc/NY5Q-7JG2 (http:/
/www.michigan.gov/documents/mgcb/revstaxes_2013_414056_7.pdf) (accessed Aug. 31, 2014).
112. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)–(3), (d)(2)(A) (requiring tribal gaming “net revenues” to be used exclu-
sively for governmental purposes).
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year 2013,113 and are likely to replicate that number in calendar year
2014.114 Of course, that amount is substantially lower than in years past:
2012 – $114 million;115
2011 – $115 million;116
2010 – $99 million;117
2009 – $122 million;118
2008 – $121 million;119
2007 – $157 million;120
2006 – $157 million;121
2005 – $148 million.122
The Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe’s casino revenues (as opposed to
profit)—and accompanying two percent payments to local units of govern-
ment respectively—have also declined during the same period:
2013 – $2.54 billion and $5.08 million;
2012 – $2.91 billion and $5.83 million;
2011 – $2.91 billion and $5.86 million;
2010 – $3.09 billion and $6.18 million;
2009 – $3.37 billion and $6.73 million;
2008 – $3.68 billion and $7.36 million;
113. Mich. Gaming Control Bd., Detroit Casino Revenues, Calendar Year 2013, http://perma.cc/
SL68-FXK3 (http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mgcb/revstaxes_2013_414056_7.pdf) (accessed
Aug. 31, 2014).
114. Mich. Gaming Control Bd., Detroit Casino Revenues, Calendar Year 2014, http://perma.cc/
PE2N-NEXH (http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mgcb/revstaxes_2014_448832_7.pdf) (accessed
Aug. 31, 2014) (demonstrating that in the first six months of calendar year 2014, the Detroit casinos paid
out over $54 million).
115. Mich. Gaming Control Bd., Detroit Casino Revenues, Calendar Year 2012, http://perma.cc/
Q2DZ-BZTD (http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mgcb/revstaxes_2012_377293_7.pdf) (accessed
Aug. 31, 2014).
116. Mich. Gaming Control Bd., Detroit Casino Revenues, Calendar Year 2011, http://perma.cc/
QNX9-4DLH (http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mgcb/revstaxes_2011_345700_7.pdf) (accessed
Aug. 31, 2014).
117. Mich. Gaming Control Bd., Detroit Casino Revenues, Calendar Year 2010, http://perma.cc/
6VRE-L8EY (http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mgcb/revstaxes_2010_311200_7.pdf) (accessed
Aug. 31, 2014).
118. Mich. Gaming Control Bd., Detroit Casino Revenues, Calendar Year 2009, http://perma.cc/
9TMM-X9NA (http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mgcb/revstaxes_2009_267050_7.pdf) (accessed
Aug. 31, 2014).
119. Mich. Gaming Control Bd., Detroit Casino Revenues, Calendar Year 2008, http://perma.cc/
3K48-6LAM (http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mgcb/revstaxes_2008_225481_7.pdf) (accessed
Aug. 31, 2014).
120. Mich. Gaming Control Bd., Detroit Casino Revenues, Calendar Year 2007, http://perma.cc/
SZ62-XQB3 (http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mgcb/revstaxes_2007_186949_7.pdf) (accessed
Aug. 31, 2014).
121. Mich. Gaming Control Bd., Detroit Casino Revenues, Calendar Year 2006, http://perma.cc/
SVF7-YFT6 (http://www.michigan.gov/documents/revstaxes_2006_150388_7.pdf) (accessed Aug. 31,
2014).
122. Mich. Gaming Control Bd., Detroit Casino Revenues, Calendar Year 2005, http://perma.cc/
GA4V-3MPM (http://www.michigan.gov/documents/revstaxes_2005_116383_7.pdf) (accessed Aug.
31, 2014).
20
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2007 – $3.66 billion and $7.90 million;
2006 – $3.95 billion and $7.73 million;
2005 – $3.86 billion and $7.73 million.123
Also, compare the revenue stream and two percent payments of the
Nottawaseppi Huron Band of the Potawatomi, which has only been gaming
since mid-2009:
2013 – $2.63 billion and $5.27 million;
2012 – $2.47 billion and $4.95 million;
2011 – $2.43 billion and $4.87 million;
2010 – $2.43 billion and $4.86 million;
2009 – $96.68 million and $1.93 million.
Finally, compare the revenue stream and two percent payments of the
Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians during this period, using the
same method:
2013 – $86.76 million and $1.74 million;
2012 – $89.23 million and $1.78 million;
2011 – $90.99 million and $1.82 million;
2010 – $90.24 million and $1.80 million;
2009 – $87.51 million and $1.75 million;
2008 – $96.99 million and $1.94 million;
2007 – $97.56 million and $1.95 million;
2006 – $99.11 million and $1.98 million;
2005 – $98.04 million and $1.96 million.
The differences between the lower peninsula tribes (Saginaw Chip-
pewa and Nottawaseppi Huron Band) and the upper peninsula tribe (Sault
Tribe) is drastic.124 It makes some sense that the northern tribe would at-
tempt to enter the downstate gaming market. Using market studies, and as-
suming those market studies were reasonably accurate, the three tribes
could reach an understanding of the economic impact of new casinos in
Lansing and near the Detroit Metro airport and how those casinos would
affect the downstate casinos. Politics and other factors aside, the three tribes
123. Mich. Gaming Control Bd., 2% of Slot Revenue Payments to Local Units of Government, http://
perma.cc/K7KM-HXAM (http://www.michigan.gov/documents/2_percent_Payments_76617_7.pdf) (ac-
cessed Aug. 31, 2014) (figures are derived from the state’s reporting of the tribe’s payments of slot
revenue to local units of government).
124. I have not even mentioned the Bay Mills Indian Community, victorious in a major Supreme
Court confrontation, Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 134 S. Ct. 2024 (2014), preserving the
tribe’s immunity from a state suit to close the tribe’s off-reservation casino in Vanderbilt, Michigan. Bay
Mills’ leadership has discussed proposing a casino in Port Huron, Michigan, and perhaps elsewhere in
southeastern Michigan. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Turtle Talk Blog, 1500-Slot Casino Planned for Port
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might come to an accord on how to mitigate the new casinos’ impact on the
current casinos through a form of intertribal revenue sharing.125
The state’s interests are far more complicated. Assuming for a mo-
ment, and this is a big assumption, that the state is only interested in gov-
ernmental revenue maximization, then the state will need to analyze the
same market studies involving the impacts of new casinos on the current
tribal casinos downstate, and then add in market studies on the impacts of
the new casinos on the three Detroit casinos. It may be that new downstate
casinos will not generate enough new revenue for the state to justify not
fighting the Sault Tribe casino proposal. Schumpeterian economics, for ex-
ample, suggests that new casinos are not the type of economic disruption
that would generate new economic growth.126 New casinos might not do
much more than move money around from old casinos to new casinos in a
zero-sum game. If that’s the case, then the Detroit casinos might lose mar-
ket share to the new Sault Tribe casinos. Michigan’s incentives to fight
would be apparent.
The Sault Tribe must know this is a possible concern, and perhaps the
state knows as well that there could be little benefit to letting the tribes
negotiate amongst themselves. Even so, this is an ongoing issue, and I sus-
pect the parties have been negotiating quietly for some time. Lansing is an
open market, and the Detroit airport is located further from the wealthy
Oakland County suburbs that likely constitute the meat of the downtown
Detroit casino market.
If the negotiations fail, or perhaps never happen, then the parties will
eventually litigate over the nuances of the Michigan Indian Land Claims
Settlement Act,127 IGRA,128 and the Interior Secretary’s authority to ac-
quire land in trust for Indian nations129—perhaps first in the federal admin-
istrative process, before proceeding to federal court. The process is likely to
take most of a decade.
IGRA is a federalism statute, implemented through Congressional
powers under the Commerce Clause, which significantly restricts state au-
thority over Indian gaming operations.130 But the statute is a compromise
law, assuring states that Indian tribes cannot open up Vegas-style casinos
125. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Turtle Talk Blog, Toward Intertribal Revenue Sharing, http://per
ma.cc/5RZ6-XSY9 (http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2011/09/08/toward-intertribal-revenue-sharing/)
(Sept. 8, 2011).
126. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Indian Tribal Businesses and the Off-Reservation Market, 12 Lewis &
Clark L. Rev. 1047, 1059–1060 (2008).
127. Pub. L. 105–143, 111 Stat. 2652 (1997).
128. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721.
129. 25 U.S.C. § 465.
130. Frank Ducheneaux, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: Background and Legislative History,
42 Ariz. St. L.J. 99, 182–183 (2010).
22
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anywhere they want outside of Indian country.131 The regime all but guar-
anteed that Indian nations closer to gaming markets would enjoy a major
windfall, leaving Indian nations located far from metropolitan areas at a
severe market disadvantage. The Sault Tribe’s efforts to move downstate
are efforts to disrupt IGRA’s regime.
C. People — Oglala Sioux Tribe
The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)132 is a terrifically unusual stat-
ute. It implicates federalism concerns133 in a manner even more intrusive on
state police powers than the federal Indian gaming act, intended by Con-
gress to undo incredible state administrative and judicial discrimination
against American Indian parents.134 ICWA, enacted in 1978, was an enor-
mous disruption to the status quo of child welfare. Congress mandated that
state courts and agencies notify Indian nations whenever Indian parents’
rights could be terminated, or an Indian child could be placed in foster care;
granted Indian nations the right to intervene in these state court matters;
allowed for the transfer of these cases to tribal courts; and imposed different
standards for state courts to apply.135 State courts and agencies have re-
sisted ICWA from its inception—sometimes overtly and sometimes not.136
Many court-appointed guardians ad litem disagree with the goals of the
statute and seek to undermine it.137 Many state courts, state workers, and
even attorneys are simply unaware of the statute.138
Even so, several states have codified versions of ICWA, including for
example, California,139 Iowa,140 Michigan,141 and Nebraska.142 For several
131. Heidi McNeil Staudenmaier, Kathryn R.L. Rand, Gabriel S. Galanda, D. Michael McBride, III,
& Steven J. Zweig, Native American Off-Reservation Gaming, 16 Gaming L. Rev. & Econ. 338 (2012).
132. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963.
133. See generally Jill Hasday, Family Law Reimagined (Harv. U. Press 2014) (To be sure, there is
significant scholarly authority for the proposition that the federal government has been engaged in fam-
ily law for much of American history, contrary to the assumption by courts and perhaps others that
family law is the exclusive province of the states.).
134. Lorie Graham, Reparations and the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 Legal Stud. Forum 619,
624–626 (2001).
135. B.J. Jones, Mark Tilden & Kelly Gaines-Stoner, The Indian Child Welfare Act Handbook: A
Legal Guide to the Custody and Adoption of Native American Children (2d ed., ABA 2008); Native Am.
Rights Fund, A Practical Guide to the Indian Child Welfare Act (2007) (available at http://perma.cc/
ZV7T-43GC (http://narf.org/icwa/)).
136. See generally Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints under the Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward a
New Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 Emory L.J. 587 (2002).
137. See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher & Kathryn E. Fort, Indian Children and Their Guardians
ad Litem, 93 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 59 (2013), http://perma.cc/K5JR-7ZNQ (http://www.bu.edu/bulaw
review/files/2013/11/FLETCHER-AND-FORT.pdf).
138. Hilary N. Weaver & Barry J. White, Protecting the Future of Indigenous Children and Nations:
An Examination of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 10 J. Health & Soc. Policy 35, 35–36 (1999).
139. Cal. Welfare & Instns. Code Ann. § 224 (West 2014).
140. Iowa Indian Child Welfare Act, Iowa Code Ann. § 232B (West 2014).
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children’s rights organizations, ICWA is a best-practices statute that should
serve as a model for how all state child welfare statutes should protect chil-
dren.143
According to pleadings in Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Van Hunnik,144 South
Dakota judges, allegedly under the influence of one judge,145 have con-
ducted a run-around of the statute’s requirement that “emergency removal
or placement [of an Indian child by a state court] terminates immediately
when such removal or placement is no longer necessary to prevent immi-
nent physical damage or harm to the child.”146 As the plaintiffs pointed out
in a recent motion for summary judgment:
Section 1922 is a uniquely important vehicle for keeping Indian children out
of foster care, and yet Defendants routinely violate it. Specifically, Defend-
ants were ordered by this Court to produce the transcripts of every third 48-
hour hearing conducted since January 1, 2010, see Order Granting Motion for
Expedited Discovery (Docket 71), resulting in the production of more than
120 hearing transcripts. In more than 90 percent of those hearings, the court
entered orders granting the request of the Department of Social Services
(“DSS”) for continued custody of the Indian children involved in the case. 5
SUF ¶ 2. Thus, each year, Defendants remove approximately 150 children
from their families. Id. If Defendants would stop viewing § 1922 as a statute
of deferment and start complying with it, the number of Indian children in
foster care would likely decrease significantly.147
In a second motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs alleged massive
due process violations covering hundreds of cases:
All of the 48-hour hearings conducted by Defendants since January 1, 2010
have violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in most,
141. Michigan Indian Family Preservation Act, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 712b (West 2014).
142. Nebraska Indian Child Welfare Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 43-15012 to 43-1516 (West 2013).
143. See Br. of Casey Family Programs, Child Welfare League of Am., Children’s Defense Fund,
Donaldson Adoption Inst., N. Am. Council on Adoptable Children, Voice for Adoption, and Twelve
Other Natl. Child Welfare Orgs. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respt. Birth Father, Adoptive Couple v.
Baby Girl, 2013 WL 1279468 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2013) (No. 12–399).
144. 993 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (D.S.D 2014).
145. Or. Denying Mots. to Dismiss at 20–21, Oglala Sioux Tribe (D.S.D. Jan. 28, 2014) (No. 5:13-
cv-5020-JLV) (Judge Davis allegedly established a series of guidelines applicable to Indian child wel-
fare cases: plaintiffs claim Judge Davis has instituted six of his own policies, practices, and customs for
48-hour hearings which violate the Due Process Clause and ICWA. These include: not allowing Indian
parents to see the ICWA petition filed against them; not allowing the parents to see the affidavit support-
ing the petition; not allowing the parents to cross-examine the person who signed the affidavit; not
permitting the parents to present evidence; placing Indian children in foster care for a minimum of 60
days without receiving any testimony from qualified experts related to “active efforts” being made to
prevent the break-up of the family; and failing to take expert testimony that continued custody of the
child by the Indian parent or custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the
child.); Pls.’ Response to Def. Davis’ Mot. to Dismiss, Oglala Sioux Tribe, 2013 WL 2647100 (D.S.D.
June 6, 2013) (No. 5:13-cv-05020-JLV).
146. 25 U.S.C. § 1922.
147. Pls.’ First Mot. for P.S.J. re: Violations of 25 U.S.C. § 1922 at 5–6, Oglala Sioux Tribe, 2014
WL 3509236 (D.S.D. July 7, 2014) (No. 5:13-cv-05020-JLV).
24
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if not all, of the five respects discussed below, thereby causing significant and
irreparable injuries to the two Tribal Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class of In-
dian parents. These five areas of constitutional violations are:
(1) Defendants have failed to give parents adequate notice of the claims
against them, the issues to be decided, and the State’s burden of proof;
(2) Defendants have denied parents the opportunity to present evidence
in their defense;
(3) Defendants have denied parents the opportunity to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses;
(4) Defendants have failed to provide indigent parents with the opportu-
nity to be represented by appointed counsel; and
(5) Defendants have removed Indian children from their homes without
basing their removal orders on evidence adduced in the hearing, and then
subsequently issued written findings that bore no resemblance to the facts
presented at the hearing.
Defendants’ 48-hour hearings are so fundamentally unfair and one-sided
that they amount to nothing more than a charade. As recently as June 23,
2014, for instance, Judge Davis conducted a 48-hour hearing in Case No.
A14-444, where the only questions he asked the mother before removing her
two children were whether she understood her rights and whether she wanted
an attorney. No adverse allegations were made against the mother. Nor did
the state introduce any evidence indicating (much less proving) that the chil-
dren would be at risk if returned to the mother. Nor was the mother asked if
she wanted to present any evidence or make a statement. Judge Davis simply
took away her children.148
The Oglala Sioux Tribe and the Rosebud Sioux Tribe originally
brought the suit as a class action as parens patriae.149 The tribes noted that
tribal members and Indian nations have an unusually close relationship:
The Tribes bring this action as parens patriae to vindicate rights afforded to
their members by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
by ICWA. The Tribes and their members have a close affiliation, indeed kin-
ship, with respect to the rights and interests at stake in this litigation. The
future and well-being of the Tribes is inextricably linked to the health, wel-
fare, and family integrity of their members.150
Undoubtedly, indigent individual tribal member parents facing these cir-
cumstances likely have insufficient resources to bring a broad challenge to
the practices of the South Dakota court system.
So far in this matter, the state court defendants have argued that the
tribes’ legal theories are incorrect.151 Federalism issues abound—the plain-
148. Pls.’ Second Mot. for P.S.J.: Due Process Violations at 7–8, Oglala Sioux Tribe, 2014 WL
3509239 (D.S.D. July 7, 2014) (No. 5:13-cv-05020-JLV).
149. Class Action Compl. for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 4, Oglala Sioux Tribe, 2013 WL
1178660 (D.S.D. Mar. 21, 2013) (No. 5:13-cv-05020-JLV).
150. Id.
151. Defs.’ Response [to] Pls.’ Mot. for S.J. re: 25 U.S.C. § 1922, Oglala Sioux Tribe, 2014 WL
4447163 (D.S.D. Sept. 5, 2014) (No. Civ. 13-5020-JLV); Defs.’ Response to Pls.’ Mot. for P.S.J. re:
Due Process, Oglala Sioux Tribe (D.S.D. Sept. 5, 2014) (No. Civ. 13-5020-JLV).
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tiffs are asking a federal court to intervene in the policies and practices of
state court judges.
IV. FEDERALISM IMPLICATIONS
Academics continue to debate whether American federalism as envi-
sioned in the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution had its origins
in American Indian political theory, most notably that of the Haude-
nosaunee Confederacy. Gordon Wood’s malicious take-down of Laura Na-
der in his controversial review of Alison LaCroix’s The Ideological Origins
of American Federalism indicates that there are very strong feelings about
the Haudenosaunee contributions to American federalism.152 Arguments
aside, it is now clear that “federalism existed within tribal governing struc-
tures long before it was adopted within the U.S. Constitution.”153
Courts and commentators have struggled with how to handle the pres-
ence of Indian nations in the American federalism structure since before the
Framing. Though the Constitution creates a place for Indian nations, their
placement is in direct opposition to the federal government and the states.
The Constitution merely places Congress in the position to regulate com-
merce with Indian nations, and the executive branch in the position of nego-
tiating with Indian nations via the treaty power. It is well understood that
early American Indian affairs policies dealt with Indian nations and Indian
people as competitors to land and resources.154
In the modern era, now that nearly all of the land and resources have
fallen out of Indian and tribal hands, it is simple enough for many states and
local governments—as well most federalism commentators155—to ignore
Indian nations. Even in Michigan, where there are 12 federally recognized
Indian tribes, tribal officials encounter constant turnover in state administra-
tive officials, which forces tribal representatives to perpetually educate state
officials about the basics of federal Indian law, Michigan Anishinaabe his-
tory, and modern Michigan tribal governments.156
152. Gordon S. Wood, Federalism from the Bottom Up, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 705, 705–706 (2011)
(reviewing Alison L. LaCroix, The Ideological Origins of American Federalism (Harv. U. Press 2010)).
153. Singel, supra n. 25, at 782 (citing Donald S. Lutz, The Iroquois Confederations Constitution:
An Analysis, 28 Publius 99 (Spring 1998)).
154. Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Policy in the Formative Reason: The Indian Trade and
Intercourse Acts, 1790-1834, at 27 (Harv. U. Press 1962); Andrew McFarland Davis, The Employment
of Indian Auxiliaries in the American War, 2 English Historical Rev. 709, 712 (1887) (describing the
various methods, including massive fraud and violence, used by Americans to dispossess Indian lands).
155. Steven Paul McSloy, Border Wars: Haudenosaunee Lands and Federalism, 46 Buff. L. Rev.
1041, 1041–1042 (1998).
156. To be fair, thanks to American educators also ignoring Indian affairs history and politics, many
tribal officials need the same education about their own tribes.
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But Indian nations and their members and citizens remain governed,157
and their relationships with states and the federal government are still
mostly governed, by eighteenth century constitutional provisions and nine-
teenth century treaty terms. Congress has enacted hundreds of statutes gov-
erning those relationships, but despite notable successes like the Indian
Self-Determination Acts,158 relations between Indian nations and state and
local governments are largely unregulated. Even where Congress has writ-
ten rules governing states and tribes, in the so-called Public Law 280 states
(and parallel states), the legislation often failed miserably.159 In far too
many parts of Indian country, conflicts reign.
It is helpful to start with Judge Skretny’s dictum laying out the conflict
between states and tribes before analyzing the implications of tribal disrup-
tion on federalism:
One of federalism’s fundamental principles is that the States are primarily
responsible for protecting the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens. As
such, the State of New York has a legitimate and substantial interest in enact-
ing laws and regulations pursuant to its historic police power. On the other
hand, Indian tribes have a unique sovereign status, recognized by the Supreme
Court and deeply rooted in traditions of tribal independence, which insulates
them from state regulation in some respects.160
This characterization makes tribal-state relations appear to be a straight-up
conflict between state police powers (impliedly protected by the structure of
the Constitution and expressly by the Tenth Amendment) and tribal sover-
eignty (impliedly recognized by the Indian Commerce Clause and expressly
protected nowhere in the Constitution). As Professor Singel persuasively
argues, this characterization allows (and in fact encourages) courts to label
tribal governance “dangerously foreign, destabilizing, and undemo-
cratic.”161 Add in the fact that the Constitution is designed to guarantee a
robust place for state governance in the context of the greater polity, and
not tribes, it is all too easy for federal and state courts to undervalue tribal
interests in disputes with states and local governments.
In line with Professor Epstein and Mr. Loyola’s views, Professor
Singel recommends that courts look instead at the well-established values
of federalism: (1) checks and balances against actual tyranny; (2) demo-
157. Joseph William Singer, Double Bind: Indian Nations v. The Supreme Court, 119 Harv. L. Rev.
Forum 1, 2 (2005) (“Writing Indians out of the Constitution . . . would appear to be beyond the legiti-
mate powers of the Court.”).
158. E.g. Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450 et seq.; Native
American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 4101–4243.
159. See generally Duane Champagne & Carole Goldberg, Captured Justice: Native Nations and
Public Law 280 (Carolina Academic Press 2012); Indian L. & Or. Commn., supra n. 16.
160. Ward v. N.Y., 291 F. Supp. 2d 188, 193 (W.D.N.Y. 2003).
161. Singel, supra n. 25, at 781 (citing Raymond D. Austin, Navajo Courts and Navajo Common R
Law: A Tradition of Tribal Self-Governance, at xx (U. of Minn. Press 2009)).
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cratic participation and accountability; (3) local autonomy; and (4) prob-
lem-solving capacity.162
I would add that disruption of the superior sovereign’s preferences and
initiatives could be a fifth important value of federalism—or at least in the
context of what Professor Singel calls “tribal federalism.”163 Professor Ep-
stein and Mr. Loyola stridently argue the Supreme Court should undo its
modern constitutional jurisprudence—and undo the New Deal with it:
There is no principled reason to show the Supreme Court’s New Deal deci-
sions more deference than the New Deal Court showed the precedents which
time had handed down to it.
At the highest level of abstraction, the key task is for the Supreme Court to
start undoing the major mistakes that started with the Progressive era a cen-
tury ago. What that means concretely is that the Court must once again begin
to protect the rights of all minority interests, including rights of property and
economic liberty; to make sure that the power to tax and spend is really being
used “for the general Welfare of the United States”; to preserve meaningful
state sovereignty over some part of the purely internal commerce of the states;
and to ensure the separation of state and federal government operations.164
Perhaps Professor Epstein and Mr. Loyola do not envision tribal interests as
the type of “minority interests” they wish the Supreme Court to protect. But
that is a red herring. Moreover, rethinking and perhaps undoing the New
Deal-era’s federalism jurisprudence is disruption at the highest level, analo-
gous to restoring hundreds of millions of square miles of land to tribal and
Indian ownership. It probably will not happen.
But disruption is the value here, not destruction. Indian nations and
Indian people are uniquely situated to understand what true American tyr-
anny and national government dominance looks like. Felix S. Cohen’s The
Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-1953: A Case Study in Bureaucracy,165 and
similar works,166 depict modern federal government abuses that go way be-
yond Professor Epstein and Mr. Loyola’s nightmares. Mid-twentieth cen-
tury federal Indian affairs administration was a horror show. Here are but a
few examples:
162. Id. at 821–826.
163. Id. at 817.
164. Epstein & Loyola, Saving Federalism, supra n. 1.
165. 62 Yale L. J. 348 (1953).
166. Congressional reports at the time of the enactment of the American Indian Religious Freedom
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996, recognized deprivations of Indian freedoms ongoing as of 1978. See H.R. Rpt.
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Military-style control: “Administrators accustomed to exercising the powers
of a military government were impatient of legal restraints as they undertook
to govern all aspects of the lives of their subject peoples.”167
Interference with tribal elections: “When the Blackfeet Tribe held a referen-
dum election on May 9, 1952, on a proposed amendment to the tribal consti-
tution, the Interior Department ran a rival election, managed by Indian Bureau
employees; called out its special Bureau police force; closed down one or
more tribal polling places; seized tribal funds, without tribal consent, to pay
some of the expenses of the Bureau election (notwithstanding Secretary
Chapman’s assurance that no such action was contemplated); and, in order to
validate its own election results, tried to strike more than 1,000 Blackfeet
names from the list of eligible voters.”168
Denial of the right to counsel: “[D]uring more than a decade before [Indian
Affairs Commissioner Dillon S.] Myer took office no Indian tribe had ever
been denied the right to retain as its attorney any lawyer in good standing at
the bar. Since Mr. Myer took office more than forty Indian tribes have com-
plained of Bureau interference in the exercise of this right. The Secretary on
January 24, 1952, announced appointment of a committee to look into this
problem. At last reports, the committee had never met.”169
Denial of the freedom of speech: “Yet when the Oglala Sioux Tribe on Sep-
tember 28, 1950, petitioned Congress to cut wasteful expenditures of the In-
dian Bureau in its so-called ‘extension service’ in South Dakota, the Indians
were advised that $140,000 of credit funds allocated to the tribe several
months earlier would be ‘frozen’ until the tribe withdrew its criticisms.”170
Denial of the freedom of religion: “Where native religious customs interfere
with administrative convenience, Commissioner Myer has taken the position
that Indian Bureau officials regularly maintained in the 1880’s and 1890’s:
native custom must give way. For example, at one of the Rio Grande Pueblos,
where ancient custom requires that no white person remain within the Pueblo
at certain ceremonials, the Indian Bureau now insists that its employees will
remain on the Pueblo grounds notwithstanding the objection of the Indian
landowners to their presence.”171
That is a merely a small sample. The federal government has improved
dramatically in the exercise of its trust responsibility toward Indian nations
and Indian people in the past few decades, but Indian people who are alive
are all too cognizant of a dramatically different state of affairs—they lived
through federal tyranny of a kind contemporary Americans would not be-
lieve.172
167. Cohen, supra n. 165, at 352.
168. Id. at 354.
169. Id. at 355–356.
170. Id. at 356.
171. Id. at 359.
172. Singel, supra n. 25, at 832–833 (“[Maine] child protective services had conducted continual R
surveillance of Maliseet families.”) (citation omitted) (Professor Singel details instances of state tyranny
as well.).
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Tribal governance, for all its flaws, is directed by American citizens
who have faced down modern federal bureaucratic tyranny and are more
driven to govern well than virtually all other Americans. Moreover, al-
though it does happen in some communities, tribal elected officials rarely
are beholden to political campaign contributors in the same way federal and
state elected officials often are.
Consider the Wind River EPA dispute under Professor Singel’s four-
part rubric for analyzing the values of federalism—checks and balances
against actual tyranny; democratic participation and accountability; local
autonomy; and problem-solving capacity.173 Recall that the EPA granted
the Wind River tribes TAS status for the purpose of becoming eligible for
receiving federal grants and for greater participation rights in permitting
processes.174 That the EPA’s decision confers no regulatory authority on
the tribes undermines the argument that the tribes’ actions could undermine
state and local authority.
But Wyoming and its political subdivisions look beyond, to perhaps a
time when the EPA sees fit to recognize the Wind River tribes as states for
purposes of regulating reservation point source polluters. It appears from
the early rhetoric that state and local officials are worried that a tribal na-
tion, unaccountable to the state and local electorate, will then make deci-
sions that affect the daily lives of non-tribal members. Of course, Wind
River tribal members can say the same thing, and to back their claims, the
reservation may remain over-polluted and under-regulated for years to
come. Yes, tribal regulatory jurisdiction over Indian and non-Indian lands
within the Wind River jurisdiction will be disruptive—but disruption is not
an inherent evil.
173. Singel, supra n. 25, at 821–826.
174. EPA, Approval of Application Submitted by the East Shoshone Tribe and North Arapaho Tribe
for Treatment in a Similar Manner as a State for Purposes of Clean Air Act (Dec. 6, 2013) (available at
http://perma.cc/Z6QH-3MUU (http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/epa-approval.pdf)).
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